Most juridical systems contain the principle that an act is only unlawful if the agent conducting the act has a`guilty mind' (`mens rea'). Different law systems distinguish dierent modes of mens rea. For instance, American law distinguishes between`knowingly' performing a criminal act,`recklessness',`strict liability', etc. I will show we can formalize several of these categories. The formalism I use is a complete stit -logic featuring operators for stit -actions taking eect in`next' states, S5-knowledge operators and SDL-type obligation operators. The dierent modes of`mens rea' correspond to the violation conditions of dierent types of obligation denable in the logic.
Introduction
An important distinction in law is the one between`actus reus', which translates to`guilty act', and`mens rea' for`guilty mind'. It is a general principle of law that both these conditions should be met for an act to qualify as criminal, that is, guilt not only presupposes a forbidden act as such, also, the performing agent must have committed the act knowingly, intentionally, purposely, etc. 1 .
The task of showing that both necessary conditions`actus reus' and`mens rea' apply to an alleged criminal act, is in law referred to as`showing concurrence'.
There are dierent levels of mens rea, each corresponding to dierent levels of culpability. And, of course, dierent law systems have dierent categories. The current North American system works with the following modes, in decreasing order of culpability (as taken from [18] ):
• Purposefully -the actor has the "conscious object" of engaging in conduct and believes and hopes that the attendant circumstances exist.
• Knowingly -the actor is certain that his conduct will lead to the result. 1 The general principle was already formulated back in 1797, by the English jurist Edward Coke: "actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea", which is Latin for "an act does not make somebody guilty unless his/her mind is also guilty"
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• Recklessly -the actor is aware that the attendant circumstances exist, but nevertheless engages in the conduct that a "law-abiding person" would have refrained from.
• Negligently -the actor is unaware of the attendant circumstances and the consequences of his conduct, but a "reasonable person" would have been aware
• Strict liability -the actor engaged in conduct and his mental state is irrelevant The rst class, the one of acts committed purposefully, is about acts that are instrumental in reaching an agent's malicious goal. The second class is not directly about an agent's intentions, aims or goals, but only about the condition whether or not an agent knows what it is doing. The third class is a little less clear. I think it is defendable to interpret it as the category of acts where an agent knowingly risks an unlawful outcome. For the fourth category, not knowing the (possible, or necessary -that is not made explicit) outcomes is not an excuse: if the agent did not know, it simply should have known. The nal category concerns the complete absence of`mens rea'. This is the category where agents can be culpable without having a`guilty mind' whatsoever.
I claim the levels of culpability correspond to (1) levels of excusability and (2) levels of deontic strength. For the rst class, the deontic strength is lowest of all and several excuses apply. In particular, for this class an`actus reus' can be accompanied by the valid excuses: "I did not have bad intentions", "I did not know what I was doing", etc, etc. For the second category, deontic strength is higher, and less excuses apply. In particular, the excuse that there were no bad intentions is no longer acceptable. What counts is that the agent knew what it was doing, irrespective of the goal the act was aimed at. For the third category, where the deontic strength is yet higher, it is not even an excuse that the agent was not sure about the outcome: the agent is liable simply because it takes the risk the outcome is unlawful. In the fourth category, the excuse that the agent, "stupid enough", did not realize the consequences of his act, is no longer valid: for violations of any prohibition in this category he is still liable, because any`reasonable' agent would have foreseen the consequences. And nally, for the strict liability category, deontic strength is highest of all, and no excuses referring to the mental state of an agent apply at all.
In philosophy, the idea that excuses play an important role in distinguishing dierent modes of acting was put forward by Austin [5] . And many other kinds of excuses than the ones above are thinkable. For instance, among the most well-known excuses for violating an obligation are: "I was not able to", "I do not agree my act counts-as a violation", "I obeyed a stronger, conicting obligation" and "I did not know I had to". Of these, in this paper, I will only consider the rst and the last one. The rst one, about not being able to comply to the obligation, is only a valid excuse if the principle of "ought implies can" applies. The last one, concerning knowledge of the condition that the act is obliged, refers directly to the juridical principle "ignorantia juris non excusat", which translates to "ignorance of or mistake about the law is no defence". So, here the (absence of) excuse is not so much about the mode of acting, as in the modes of mens rea above, but about whether or not the agent knows about the`deontic status' of the act. This maybe subtle dierence with the described modes of mens rea is not made very clear in the juridical literature. But, in our formalizations it will be.
We will also look at how we can formally dene what counts as a`reus actus'. Also for this, the juridical literature gives exact denitions. In particular, a reus actus cannot be an involuntary act. For instance, a person being thrown of a high building, surviving his fall by crashing into another person, who gets killed as the result of functioning as a cushion, has not committed an actus reus, even though the falling person knew that he actually was crashing into the person. The current American Model Penal Code [18] lists what acts count as involuntary acts for which no agent can be liable.
• a reex or convulsion
• a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep
• conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion
• a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the eort or the determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual
In this paper we will formalize (1) the dierent modes of mens rea with the exception of the rst category concerning`purposefully' acts, (2) dierent modes of reus actus, that is, voluntary acts (3) the condition of "ignorantia juris non excusat". The mens rea class of`purposefully' acts is not considered because I do not consider goals and intentions; I leave this for future research. Almost all the other categories concern conditions referring to an agent's knowledge about his actions. And knowledge operators will be a central concern of this paper. More in particular, we will come up with many dierent notions of obligation (as is common in deontic logic, we will treat obligations and prohibitions on a par, and see prohibitions as obligations to act oppositely), many of which can be associated with one of the classes of mens rea. The formal framework is also very well suited to rene and disambiguate the classes from the juridical literature.
This paper builds up the formal framework in three stages. First, in section 2, for the formalization of the acts as such, we dene a stit-logic. Our stitlogic will be dierent from any stit-logic in the literature (with the exception of the earlier versions in [11] and [12] ) in the sense that eects occur in`next' states. In this section we make a start with our investigation of the modes of acting from the juridical literature by showing how to capture aspects of thè voluntariness' requirement for an actus reus. Then, in section 3, we add an epistemic dimension to the logic, which will enable us to express the notion of knowingly doing'. This will enable us to be precise about the epistemic aspects of an actus reus. Then, third, in section 4 the deontic operators are introduced.
In this section we dene the dierent types of obligation that correspond to dierent modes of mens rea.
2 A stit -logic aecting`next' states: XSTIT
In this section we dene a complete stit-logic where actions take eect in`next'
states: XSTIT. The logic XSTIT was rst investigated in [11] . We also used the almost identical name`X-STIT' in [13] , but there the`X' is separated from the acronym`STIT', which refers to the fact that that paper's classical instantaneous stit logic is extended with a next operator, while in the present stit-variant eectivity of stit-operators itself refers to next states. That is not the only dierence with the stit-logic(s) in [13] . In particular, the present logic drops some of the axioms in [13] , adds several new ones, and is complete. Also we use a two dimensional semantics, closer to the stit-semantics in the philosophical literature.
The most distinguishing feature of the present stit-logic is that actions only take eect in`next' states, where`next' refers to immediate successors of the present state. This distinguishes the logic not only from the stit-variant in [13] , but also from any stit-logic in the (philosophical) literature. However, there are very good reasons for taking this approach. The rst reason is that the logics of the multi-agent versions of, what we might call, the standard`instantaneous' stit, are undecidable and not nitely axiomatizable [6, 21] . The second reason is that the view that actions only take eect in some immediate next state, is the standard view in formal models of computation in computer science. And nally, also from a philosophical perspective, the choice can be advocated. Given that acting always seems associated with some eort or process, and given that these take time, we may conclude that actions take place`in' time.
Besides the usual propositional connectives, the syntax of XSTIT comprises an operator ϕ for historical necessity, which plays the same role as the wellknown path quantiers in logics such as CTL and CTL * [19] , and an operator [A xstit]ϕ for`agents A jointly see to it that ϕ in the next state'. Given a countable set of propositions P and a nite set Ags of agent names, formally the language can be described as: Denition 2.1 Given a countable set of propositions P and p ∈ P , and given a nite set Ags of agent names, and A ⊆ Ags, the formal language L XSTIT is:
We dene the temporal`next' operator as the action performed by the complete set of agents Ags, leading to a unique follow-up state:
The view that the complete set of agents uniquely determines the next state is a common one. Not only it can be found in the multi-agent stit-logics in the philosophical literature [23] , but also in related computer science formalisms such as Alternating Time Temporal Logic (ATL) [1, 2] . For the relation between stit-formalisms and ATL and Coalition Logic (CL) [28] , see [14, 15] .
Note that our stit-operator concerns, what game-theorists call,`one-shot' actions. We can also imagine to have a strategic stit-operator (see [16] ) where it is assumed that groups of agent have multiple subsequent choice points to ensure a certain condition (game theorist call these`extensive games'). In my opinion, temporal operators other than the next operator make less sense for a stit-logic that is about one-shot actions. So, I am not in favor of, for instance, Horty's choice [23] to have a`some time in the future' temporal operator in a non-strategic stit-setting. Ensuring a condition`some time in the future' seems to me intrinsically strategic, and not often something that can be accomplished by a one-shot action. Interestingly enough, none of the one-shot stit-logics in the philosophical literature has a next operator, while from my point of view the next is actually the single most intuitive temporal operator to be considered in these logics.
In the description of the models, below, we will use terminology inspired by similar terminology from Coalition Logic, and call the relations interpreting the stit-operator`eectivity' relations. However, our eectivity relations are not just the relational equivalent of the eectivity functions of CL. Our eectivity relations are relative to histories and determine the possible outcomes modulo the history. Eectivity functions in CL are relative to a state, and yield sets of possible outcomes. Denition 2.3 An XSTIT-frame is a tuple S, H, R , {R A | A ⊆ Ags} such that:
• S is a non-empty set of states. Elements of S are denoted s, s , etc.
• H is a non-empty set of histories. Histories are sets of states. Elements of H are denoted h, h , etc.
• Structured worlds are tuples s, h , with s ∈ S and h ∈ H and s ∈ h.
• R is a`historical necessity' relation over structured worlds such that h, s R h , s if and only if s = s
• The R A are`eectivity' relations over structured worlds such that:
R Ags is a`next time' relation such that if h, s R Ags h , s then h = h , and R Ags is serial and deterministic (the next state is completely determined by the choice made by the complete set of agents). So, histories`contain' linearly ordered sets of states. R A ⊆ R B for B ⊂ A (super-groups are at least as eective; in particular, eectivity for the empty`group' and possibility for the complete group are inherited by all groups) The independence of agency condition above seem quite involved. The axiomatic correspondent in denition 2.6 is more clear. Mainly, what is expressed, is that possible eectivity sets of dierent agents have a non-empty intersection.
• π is a valuation function π : P −→ 2 S×H assigning to each atomic proposition the set of history/state pairs in which they are true.
The truth conditions for the semantics of the operators are standard. The non-standard aspect is the multi-dimensionality of the semantics. Note however that our logic is not a product logic [20] , because the dimensions are not commutative.
Denition 2.5 Validity M, s, h |= ϕ, of a formula ϕ in a history/state pair s, h of a model M = S, H, R , {R A | A ⊆ Ags}, π is dened as:
Satisability, validity on a frame and general validity are dened as usual.
While the semantics is standard from a (two-dimensional) modal logic perspective, the relation with standard stit-semantics deserves some explanation. In the conditions on the frames we recognize standard stit properties like`no choice between undivided histories' and properties that are specic for the present stitversion, like`actions take eect in successor states'. Actually, the frames can easily be pictured as trees where histories branch in states, like in standard stit-theory. The main dierence is that states are not partitioned into choice sets. The choice sets appear here (implicitly) as sets of possible next states (like 6 in Coalition Logic). From a given`actual' history/state pair, we reach these choice sets by rst jumping (along R ) to another history through the same state, and then looking (along R A ) what next states are reachable through the choice made by agents on that history.
One aspect of the present semantics needs extra clarication. Like in standard stit-semantics, history/state pairs for the same state can have dierent valuations of atomic propositions. In standard stit-formalisms this is actually needed to give semantics to the instantaneous eects of actions. But here, as said, the eects are not instantaneous. Therefore, in the present logic, the fact that dierent histories through the same state can have dierent valuations of non-temporal propositions, does not carry much meaning. Of course, in the logic we can talk about atomic propositions being true or not in other histories through the same state. For instance, the formula " p" expresses that all the histories through the present state have in common that the atomic proposition p holds on them. But the point is that one might think that actually we should impose on the models that all histories through a state come with identical valuations of atomic propositions. That would induce the property ϕ → ϕ for ϕ any`stit-operator-free' formula (in [13] we gave a system involving such an axiom). However, this would complicate establishing a completeness result, and does not strengthen the logic in any essential or interesting way. We think there is no need at all to impose such a condition. Since actions only take eect in next states, alternative valuations for atomic propositions on other histories through the same state are just not relevant for the semantics of the stit-fragment of our logic. Now we go on to the axiomatization of the logic. Actually, axiomatization is fairly easy. The approach we have taken for constructing this logic is to build up the semantic conditions on frames and the corresponding axiom schemes simultaneously, while staying within the Sahlqvist class. This ensures that the semantics cannot give rise to more logical principles than can be proven from the axiomatization. Denition 2. 6 The following axiom schemas, in combination with a standard axiomatization for propositional logic, and the standard rules (like necessitation) for the normal modal operators, dene a Hilbert system for XSTIT:
The Hilbert system of denition 2.6 is complete with respect to the semantics of denition 2.5.
Proof The axioms correspond one-to-one to the semantic conditions dened on the frames (which can be easily veried with the on-line SQEMA system [17] ), and are all within the Sahlqvist class. This means that all the axioms are expressible as rst-order conditions on frames and that together they are complete with respect to the dened frame classes, cf. [9, Th.2.42].
As part of the above axiomatization, we recognize Ming Xu's axiomatization for multi-agent stit-logics (see the article in [8] ). Xu's axiomatization is for the standard, instantaneous stit-variant. The present stit-logic is dierent in two respects: (1) in the present logic, actions take eect in next states, and (2) the present logic is about groups of agents, while Xu's stit only considers individual agents. But, it should not come as a surprise that the same axioms apply to the present logic. The central property in Xu's axiomatization is the`independence of agency' property. But the issue of independence of choices of dierent agents does not depend on the condition that eects are instantaneous or occur in next states.
Pauly's Coalition logic [28] is a logic of ability that is very closely related to stit-formalisms. In particular, in [14] it is shown that Coalition Logic can be embedded in stit-logic. Since Proof Proof strategies similar to those in [14] and [13] can be applied. First we make sure that the axioms of coalition logic, after applying the above translation, are valid for the present logic. Applying the above translation to the CL-axioms from [28] yields:
It is quite straightforward to verify these properties for the present logic, either semantically, or as theorems in the Hilbert system. (⊥) follows from KD for [A xstit]. ( ) follows from normalilty of the operators. (N) follows from (X-E), the truth axiom for , and propositional reasoning. (MON) follows from the normality of the operators. (S) follows from (Indep-G) and normality of [A xstit]. Furthermore, we have to verify that the two coalition logic rules modus ponens' and`logical equivalence' apply, but that is trivial, since both rules are sound a fortiori for the present normal modal system.
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To complete the proof, we also have to show that the translation preserves validity in the other direction. Or, equivalently, we check that it preserves satisability in the same direction. That is, given that a CL formula is satisable on a CL-model, we have to show that its translation is satisable on the models dened in this paper. This is quite straightforward given the structural similarities between CL-models and the models in this paper.
Recall that the (N) axiom of CL corresponds to`maximality' of Coalition Logic eectivity functions. Maximality of eectivity functions is the key property of so called`playable' eectivity functions which Pauly proves to be equivalent to game forms. In the translation to XSTIT (1)
Proof Derivation of all properties is just a little exercise in propositional normal modal logic. In the rst property we recognize the`regularity' property of Coalition Logic. It follows directly from (Indep-G).
Now, using XSTIT, we can already make a start with formalizing one of the concepts dened in the introduction. In particular, XSTIT will enable us to consider the notion of`actus reus' more closely. As was explained, an actus reus must be a voluntary act. Some aspects of the concept`voluntary' are captured by the stit-notion of`deliberative action'. A deliberative stit-operator adds an extra condition to the standard XSTIT-operator, to avoid the property [A xstit] . The idea is that agents should not be able to bring about things that will be true inevitably, but only things that without their intervention might not become true. We can easily dene a deliberative version of the stit-operator, as follows: Proof The rst part of the conjunction is KD and thus satises weakening, but the second part not, because of the negation. Because of the negation, the second part satises strengthening, but the rst part not. The rst part satises agglomeration, but the second part not. Both parts satisfy the D-axiom.
So, deliberateness, as dened in the operator above, seems to capture at least part of what it means to act voluntarily: one could also have acted otherwise, and thus one acts voluntarily. For instance, in the introduction, the crashing into the person breaking the fall of the man thrown of the building is not a voluntary act of the falling man, because the man had no choice but to fall, with the drastic consequence as a result. However, this is not the only thing we can say about voluntary / deliberate acts. But before we can go into this further, we will need to add an epistemic dimension to our stit-framework. 3 The concept of`knowingly doing': E-XSTIT In this section we extend XSTIT with epistemic operators K a ϕ for knowledge of individual agents a, resulting in the logic E-XSTIT. This will enable us to express the concept of`knowingly doing'. Herzig and Troquard were the rst to consider the addition of knowledge operators to a stit-logic [22] . Later on the framework was adapted and extended by Broersen, Herzig and Troquard [13, 16] . The E-XSTIT of the present section extends earlier versions in several ways. In particular, three axioms for the interaction of knowledge and action are proposed. Also the semantics, being two-dimensional, is dierent from the one in [13] . Finally, the modeled concept is`knowingly doing', whereas in e.g. [22] the aim is to model`knowing how'. In my opinion these concepts are dierent. I think`knowing how' should be about whether an agent has a plan he knows to be eective. This to me seems an intrinsically strategic issue, one that cannot be approached in a non-strategic stit-setting. Also,`knowing how' is an epistemic qualication concerning an ability, while`knowingly doing' is an epistemic qualication concerning an action. Denition 3.1 Given a countable set of propositions P and p ∈ P , and given a nite set Ags of agent names, and a ∈ Ags and A ⊆ Ags, the formal language L E-XSTIT is:
Denition 3.2 An E-XSTIT-frame is a tuple S, H, R , {R A | A ⊆ Ags}, {∼ a | a ∈ Ags} such that:
• S, H, R , {R A | A ⊆ Ags} is an XSTIT-frame
• The ∼ a are epistemic equivalence relations over structured worlds such that: All relevant clauses from denition 2.5, plus:
Satisability, validity on a frame and general validity are dened as usual. It is important to emphasize that the notion of`knowingly doing' is entirely dierent from other notions combining knowledge and action or time in the literature. For instance, if we add epistemic uncertainty relations to temporal logic or dynamic logics, the choice is usually to dene them over states. In that case uncertainty, and thus knowledge, cannot concern actions or choices themselves, but only state-determinate conditions. Only if we let uncertainty range over history/state pairs, as for the present logic, we can talk about (self-)knowledge of what agents are actually doing. Denition 3. 4 The following axiom schemas, in combination with a standard axiomatization for propositional logic, and the standard rules (like necessitation) for the normal modal operators, dene a Hilbert system: All XSTIT axioms determined by denition 2.6 S5 for each K a
Theorem 3.1 The Hilbert system of denition 3.4 is complete with respect to the semantics of denition 3.3.
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Proof Like for XSTIT, the axioms for E-XSTIT correspond one-to-one to the semantic conditions, and are in the Sahlqvist class.
Before we elaborate on the interaction properties of E-XSTIT we list some properties that are derivable as theorems. Proposition 3.2 The following are theorems in E-XSTIT:
The last theorem in the list below is the well known`perfect recall' or`no forgetting' axiom, known from the literature on the interaction between epistemic and temporal modalities.
We now discuss each of the knowledge-action interaction properties in the E-XSTIT-semantics and axiomatization. The rst one says that epistemic equivalence sets are closed under choices 2 . The corresponding axiom, is K a Xϕ → K a [a xstit]ϕ (this property does not hold if the stit-operator is replaced by a deliberative stit-oparator). This property ensures that an agent cannot know that two histories belonging to the same choice are dierent, or, in other words, for any agent the histories within its own choices are indistinguishable. This means that agents cannot knowingly do more then what is aected by the choices they have. In particular, the property K a Xϕ → K a [a xstit]ϕ says that agents can only know things about the (immediate) future if they are the result of an action they themselves knowingly perform. Then, an agent unknowingly does everything that is (1) true for all the history/state pairs belonging to the actual choice it makes in the actual state, but (2) not true for all the history/state pairs it considers possible. In general the things an agent does unknowingly vastly outnumber the things an agent knows it does. For instance, by sending an email, we may enforce many, many things we are not aware of, which are nevertheless the result of me sending the email. All these things we do unknowingly by knowingly sending the email.
Another, equivalent way of interpreting the property K a Xϕ → K a [a xstit]ϕ is to say that it expresses that agents cannot know what actions other agents perform concurrently. This is because the independence property (Indep-G) guarantees that choices of other agents always rene the choices of the agent we consider. Then, knowing the choice of the other would mean that the agent would be able to know more about the future state of aairs then is guaranteed by his own action.
The second constraint on the interaction between knowledge and action is the one expressed by the axiom K a [a xstit]ϕ → XK a ϕ. The issue here is that if agents knowingly see to it that a condition holds in the next state, in that same next state they will recall that the condition holds. Like for the previous property, of course, I do not want to claim that this is a property that is necessarily true for all systems of agents. Yet it is a property that we can impose for idealized agents that are not forgetful.
Finally, we discuss the interaction property ♦K a [a xstit]ϕ → K a ♦[a xstit]ϕ. It says that if an agent can knowingly see to it that ϕ, then it knows that among its repertoire of choices there is one ensuring ϕ. This property is the stit-version of the constraint concerning`uniform strategies' game theorists talk about. In game theory, uniform strategies require that agents have the same choices in all states within information sets. Since in game theory the choices are given names, a constraint is formulated saying that each state within the information set should have choices of the same type (that is, choices with the same name). In the present stit-setting, we do not have names. But the intuition that the same choices should be possible in dierent states of an information set, still applies. The property ♦K a [a xstit]ϕ → K a ♦[a xstit]ϕ exactly captures this intuition. It says that if an agent has the possibility to knowingly see to it that ϕ, then at least one of its choices in the states it considers possible actually ensures ϕ (that is, a ϕ-action is possible in all states of the information set). Maybe it is easier to see that the negation of the property, that is ♦K a [a xstit]ϕ ∧ K a a xstit ¬ϕ (with K a the dual of K a ), is contradictory: it would be absurd if an agent has the possibility to knowingly see to it that ϕ and at the same time would consider it an epistemic possibility that it is settled that whatever it does, it allows for ¬ϕ as a possible outcome. Yet another way of phrasing the property is to say that`true ability' obeys the property of uniformity of strategies. Now we can go back to formalizing the concepts discussed in the introduction. I explained that the standard deliberative stit captures part of thè voluntariness' requirements for actus reus. However, voluntariness seems to involve more than just having had the possibility to do otherwise. Consider the following example. You carry a very dangerous contagious disease. But you do not know it. You travel by train and choose to sit next to some person and thereby unknowingly see to it that he is fatally infected. Now has an actus reus been committed (assuming spreading fatal diseases is forbidden by law)? The answer must be no. Even though it is true that you did spread the disease, and even though you could have done otherwise, what you did will not count as voluntarily or deliberately spreading the disease, simply because, to a certain extent, you did not know what you were doing. So deliberateness or voluntariness entails both the possibility to do otherwise and having knowledge of what it is one is doing. Even more, an agent should have knowledge about the side-condition also: if an agent does not know that it could have done otherwise, we would not call the action deliberate. For the epistemic position on the side-condition, we then have two possibilities, motivating two new denitions for deliberate action:
The rst notion says that deliberativeness requires that the agent not only knowingly performs the action, but also that the agent knows that the result is not settled, and thus that his action is needed to guarantee the result. The second notion has a dierent side-condition: the agent only considers it possible that the result is not settled. Proof Considerations similar to those for theorem 2.4 apply.
By having suggested some denitions for capturing the voluntariness aspect of an actus reus, we have actually already touched upon the notion of mens rea. This is because talking about epistemic aspects of action clearly already introduces`the mind' as a relevant concept in describing action. But we have not modeled any deontic aspects yet, and thus at this point we still cannot talk about the`guilt' aspect of mens rea. Deontic aspects will be the subject of the next section.
Dening deontic modalities
For the extension of our framework with an operator for`ought-to-do', we adapt the approach taken by Bartha [7] who introduces Anderson style ( [3] ) violation constants in stit-theory. The approach with violation constants is very well suited for theories of ought-to-do, witness the many logics based on adding violation constants to dynamic logic [25, 10] . However, we believe that the stit-setting is even more amenable to this approach. Some evidence for this is found in Bartha's article ( [7] ), that shows that many deontic logic puzzles (paradoxes) are representable in an intuitive way. And for the present paper a clear advantage of dening obligation as a reduction using violation constants, is that the completeness established for the logics in the previous sections is preserved after addition of the obligation operator. Denition 4.1 V is a violation constant V ∈ P .
Bartha [7] denes his reduction for`obligation to do' within the classical instantaneous stit-setting. Here we adapt that to the present situation where actions only take eect in next states. The intuition behind the denition is straightforward: an agent is obliged to do something if and only if by not performing the obliged action, it performs a violation. Since the eect of the obliged action can only be felt in next states, violations also have to be properties of next states. Formally, our denition is given by: [30] .
. Due to the propositional constant V , the part [a xstit]V is constant as a whole, which means that it does not aect the logical properties of the dened modal operator O[a xstit]ϕ. The necessity operator is S5, and [a xstit] is KD. Using standard normal modal logic correspondence theory we conclude that the combined operator [a xstit]ϕ is also KD.
The operator in the denition ensures that obligations are`moment determinate'. This means that their validity only depends on the state, and not on the history (see [23] for a further explanation of this concept). We think that this is correct. But see [29] for an opposite opinion.
In this section we will not consider the`side conditions' as in the previous sections. But these could, of course, easily be added to model the`could have done otherwise' aspect of`deliberateness'. Considering side-conditions would result in yet other categories.
Note that ¬[a xstit]ϕ expresses that a does not see to it that ϕ, which is the same as saying that a`allows' a choice for which ¬ϕ is a possible outcome.
The denition then says that all such choices do guarantee that a violation occurs. So the agent is liable, because its action bore the risk of a bad outcome. The above dened obligation is thus a`personal' one. If, by`coincidence', ϕ occurs, apparently due the action of other agents, while the agent bearing the obligation did not make a choice that ensured that ϕ would occur, a violation is guaranteed. So agents do not escape an obligation by having other agents do the work for them.
We can also make the denition a little weaker and say that the agent is only liable if it actually guarantees the bad outcome:
Theorem 4.2 The operator O [a xstit]ϕ is a monotonic (i.e., weak) modal logic obeying the D axiom.
Proof We have to check the properties of the combination a xstit ϕ. We recognize a normal simulation of monotonic modal logic. Since S5 obeys D, the monotonic simulation inherits D.
Because the above two denitions do not at all refer to an agent's beliefs or other mental state, they both capture variants of the mens rea mode of`strict liability'. For both denitions it is the case that if there is a violation, the agent is liable whatsoever, independent of whether or not the agent knows what it is doing. But, in my opinion this also includes the mens rea mode of`negligently'. As described in the introduction, this class concerns those cases where`a normal person' would have realized the consequences of his action. So, again, it does not matter what that agent knows about what it is doing, it is liable whatsoever. The only dierence with the`strict liability' class is that there can be discussion about what a normal person can foresee, and thus, about whether something should be strictly liable or not. Now we turn our attention to the mens rea classes 'knowingly' and`recklessly'. It is clear that to dene these, we can use the concept of`knowingly doing' as dened in the previous section. We have several options, corresponding to dierent modes of mens rea. We discuss the following three modes:
The rst operator, that is OK[a xstit]ϕ, captures the mens rea mode of recklessly'. Here the agent has to knowingly see to it that ϕ obtains, since otherwise there will be a violation. In other words, if the agent is reckless, and does an action that it knows does not exclude an unlawful outcome, it is liable.
The third operator, that is OK [a xstit]ϕ, captures the mens rea mode of knowingly'. Here there is only a violation if the agent knowingly sees to it that the opposite of the lawful outcome ϕ obtains.
Finally, the second operator, that is OK [a xstit]ϕ denes a mode of mens rea in between`recklessly' and`knowingly'. It says that the agent is liable if it knowingly refrains from obtaining ϕ. So, on the one hand, there is an aspect of recklessness: if the agent knowingly omits to do something, a violation occurs, because omitting may risk an undesirable consequence. On the other hand, if omitting is seen as a form of doing, we can also say that this expresses that there is a violation if the agent knowingly`does' the for this level of mens rea inexcusable omission. The nal subject of this section is the principle of "ignorantia juris non excusat". For all of the above variants, nothing is said about whether or not the agent actually knows whether or not it has the obligation. But, we can associate awareness of an obligation directly with awareness of the act of bringing about the violation in case of the agent not complying. So we can incorporate the principle by adapting the previous denitions as follows:
In these denitions also violations are knowingly brought about. This expresses that the agent bearing the obligation actually knows about the obligation, that is, the agent will knowingly bring about a violation if it does not comply with the obligation. Of course, looking at the formal structure of the above denitions, a fourth denition suggests itself: one where it is not necessary to perform the obliged action knowingly, while at the same time, in case of non-compliance, the violation is brought about knowingly. But it seems clear right away that this combination is absurd. We cannot knowingly bring about a violation by unknowingly failing to comply with an obligation.
Related work
In [27] a logic is presented whose semantics shares several features with ours. In particular, the logic has epistemic indistinguishability relations ranging over history/state pairs. However, actions are omitted. In [26] actions are added to this framework by using action names in the models and the object language. So, the authors take a, what we might call`dynamic logic view' on action. The work focusses on so called`knowledge based obligations'. The central idea is that when agents get to know more, there are less histories they consider possible, which in turn may induce that the subset of deontically optimal histories, may give rise to new obligations. So the phenomenon being studied is that new knowledge may induce new obligations.
In our setting the phenomenon of getting more obligations by an increase in knowledge can occur in dierent ways. One way is simply by becoming aware of an obligation, that is, getting to know that one knowingly performs a violation by not performing some obliged action. Another route to enabling that obligations arise as the result of new knowledge, is by adopting the`ought implies can' principle for the stronger variants of our obligation operator. If agents get to know how to do something knowingly, they might incur an obligation that previously did not apply due to`ought implies can'. This demonstrates that there seems to be more sides to the problem of`knowledge based obligation'.
Another well-known interaction between epistemic and deontic modalities is Åqvist's puzzle of`the knower' [4] . If knowledge is modeled using S5 and obligation using KD (SDL [30] ), from OKϕ we derive Oϕ, which is clearly undesirable in an ought-to-be reading. However, this problem does not arise in the present logic, because obligation is strictly limited to apply to actions. In particular, if in Åqvist's example, for ϕ we substitute a stit-action [α xstit]ϕ, then we can read the derivation as`the obligation to knowingly see to something implies the obligation to see to that same something'. In the present framework, that is not an undesirably property, but a desirable property obeyed by our denitions, because it is valid that OK[a xstit]ϕ → O[a xstit]ϕ.
Future research
The logics we presented ask for extension in several ways. Note rst that while the operators for agency are group operators, the operators for knowledge and obligation only refer to single agents. Actually, there are many open questions about how to generalize these operators to group operators. As is well-known, there are several notions of group-knowledge, such as`shared knowledge',`common knowledge' and`distributed knowledge'. Which ones combine with which interaction properties for knowledge and group-action is yet unclear. Likewise we can consider generalizing the obligation operator to a group operator. Given the denitions of section 4 this actually hinges on providing group operators for the knowledge modalities.
Another issue concerns the violation constants. According to the present denitions, they are not relativized to agents or sets of agents. This corresponds to a`consequentialist's' view on obligation, as in [23] , where deontic optimality is determined according to an ordering of all possible histories. We could also take the view, like in [24] , that deontic optimality orderings should be relative to agents or groups of agents. For our setting, using violation constants, that would mean that we introduce a violation constant for each agent or each group.
Conclusions
This paper presents an epistemic temporal stit-formalism that is complete with respect to a two-dimensional Kripke semantics. It introduces the new notion of`knowingly doing' and discusses some of its possible properties. Using this notion, new`epistemic' variants of operators for`ought-to-do' are dened. In particular, many modes of`mens rea' and characteristics of what counts as aǹ actus reus', as dened in the juridical literature, can be analyzed and dened in the framework.
The rst general conclusion to be drawn is that our logic framework is very useful for disambiguating and precisely dening action classes from the juridical literature. This is exemplied by the fact that in our denitions a new`natural' level of mens rea in between`knowingly' and`recklessly' popped up. Furthermore, it is clear that I showed quite some restraint in dening dierent classes; many more subtle combinations are possible, for instance by demanding`ought implies can',`side conditions', etc. This suggests that the classication from the juridical literature could be much more subtle and ne-grained than it is, and the present framework could be of help in dening such a classication.
A second conclusion I want to draw is one about deontic logic in general. Sometimes, in discussions with other logicians, I have to defend deontic logic against the claim that there is not a single principle of deontic logic that is non-disputed. To a certain extent that is true. If one aims at designing`the' logic of deontic reasoning, one is likely to end up with an extremely weak logic, since for every suggested principle, some deontic logician will raise his hand and come with a concrete scenario and the claim that this is a counter-example. In general, my claim would be that such counter-examples often introduce context that interferes with the pure deontic reasoning. For instance, the present paper makes very clear that the concept of action itself and the concept of knowledge may interact with the concept of obligation in many dierent subtle ways, giving rise to a whole plethora of denitions for ought-to-do. And then, action and knowledge are not even the only concepts interfering; there is also time, intention, etc. Then, what the present paper is also a clear example of is the phenomenon that if we want to account for all the modalities that interfere with the pure deontic modalities, and dene deontic modalities acknowledging the interactions, we get weaker logics. And this mimics closely the complaint of logicians that there is not a single principle that is not disputed. My reply is thus, that the lack of logical properties is not inherent to deontic logic. It is only that deontic modalities often appear to be rather weak because they are contaminated with other, non-deontic modalities. And one of the tasks of deontic logicians is to expose the contamination, and bring all interfering modalities to the foreground. In particular, we can view the present work as part of a greater project in search for the`building blocks' of deontic modalities. And, the building blocks investigated in this paper are`action' and`knowledge'.
